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DO DEVELOPMENT CONSIDERATIONS 
MATTER FOR EXCHANGE RATE POLICY?
John Williamson
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Chile was one of the world’s fastest-growing economies in the 1990s. 
Its growth rate of 6.8 percent per year from 1990 to 2000 (inclusive) 
was the seventh highest in the world, and by far the highest in Latin 
America. Poverty was halved, and while this was overwhelmingly 
due to growth rather than a reduction in the concentration of income, 
public services became much more equitably distributed. Inflation 
fell progressively from over 20 percent at the beginning of the decade 
to under 4 percent at the end. My own explanation of this success 
centers on the well-rounded policy measures that were implemented 
in Chile over the period. The Central Bank was one of the institutions 
responsible for implementing these successful policies. 
In particular, it helped that the Central Bank took a balanced 
view of its responsibilities. It aimed to reduce inflation, but it took 
a gradual approach rather than believing that a sudden reduction 
in inflation would automatically bring all other good things in its 
wake or that there were no trade-offs. It was also concerned with 
securing an anticyclical policy that would stabilize the real economy. 
Furthermore, it took into account the encaje, an important instrument 
in the battle to maintain a competitive exchange rate, and thereby 
avoided the overvaluation that had such a devastating effect in other 
Latin American countries.
The questions that I address in this paper are whether considerations 
of growth and development demand a more competitive exchange rate 
than might emerge spontaneously. If so, what (if any) instruments 
should be used to affect the exchange rate?
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1. THE PRIMACY OF INFLATION
I am as firm an anti-inflationist as a reasonable central banker 
could ask for. I find the evidence that the inflation tax is regressive 
to be quite persuasive, at least for Latin America. If governments 
want to spend more, they should finance their spending honestly, 
by raising taxes, and not seek to pass the cost on either to the next 
generation, by borrowing, or to the poor, through inflation. I am not 
dismissing the Keynesian argument for deficit financing when needed 
to avoid the waste of idle capacity, but rather expressing a conviction 
that the case for deficit spending on more than a cyclical basis is only 
occasionally relevant. 
I am also a convert, if not a particularly enthusiastic one, 
to the cause of inflation targeting. The macroeconomy seems to 
be adequately described by an open-economy Keynesian model 
incorporating an inflation-augmented Phillips curve (the sort of 
model that was popularized by Edmund Phelps, among others). 
The case for the central bank having a particular concern with 
inflation, however, rests on political economy rather than economic 
principles. An agency that commands sufficient policy instruments 
to stop inflation, while having an explicit mandate to preserve price 
stability and being independent of the short-run political process, 
acts as a safeguard against the sort of temptation summarized in 
the literature on the political business cycle. Views seem to have 
coalesced around the idea that a low but positive inflation rate, of 
perhaps 2.0 or at most 2.5 percent a year, provides the best possible 
balance between the costs of inflation and the danger that a zero 
floor to the nominal interest rate could lead to the emergence of a 
real interest rate that is too high for anticyclical policy.
But a particular concern is not the same as an exclusive one. 
I agree that a central bank’s main interest should be controlling 
inflation, but this does not preclude it addressing other issues. I do 
not, however, believe that in normal times those other issues need 
give particular weight to output or unemployment. The way that one 
stabilizes inflation involves monetary stimulus when unemployment 
rises, because at such times inflation may decline to a rate below the 
target. Under abnormal circumstances, like much of the world in the 
1930s or Japan in the 1990s, unemployment may become so high 
and ingrained that it is desirable to target its reduction explicitly. 
Most of the time, the only monetary policy objective that may merit 
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a sufficiently competitive exchange rate to preserve the incentive to 
invest and, thus, the supply-side growth rate.
2. EXCHANGE RATE MODELING
The overwhelming conventional view in the profession is that it 
is a mistake to try to manage exchange rates. Maybe not everyone in 
the foreign exchange market has rational expectations, but enough 
do to create the expectation that the exchange rate will be equal 
to the long-run expected exchange rate discounted by the impact 
of the currently expected disequilibria between now and the long 
run. If there are some irrational people who do not conform to those 
expectations, they will be driven out by Friedmanite profitable 
stabilizing speculation. This is known as the rational expectations, 
efficient markets (or REEM) model.
The model is aesthetically appealing, but unfortunately it is 
overwhelmingly rejected by empirical evidence. De Grauwe and 
Grimaldi (2006) list several problems with this popular model, of 
which the three most convincing are the following. First, exchange 
rate changes are not driven mainly by changes in fundamentals, as 
has been known since Meese and Rogoff (1983). Second, chartist rules 
are profitable. This shows no sign of being a temporary phenomenon. 
Milton Friedman’s argument that destabilizing speculation must 
be unprofitable is wrong (Friedman, 1953). Finally, exchange rate 
changes are not normally distributed, but exhibit fat tails (that is, 
they display more instances of extreme exchange rate changes than 
would be consistent with a normal distribution, given mean and 
standard deviation).
Theories are not supplanted because they prove inconsistent with 
the facts, but because some more appealing theory becomes available. 
De Grauwe and Grimaldi offer such an alternative theory, which they 
label a behavioral model. The essence of their model is the existence of 
two alternative bases for forecasting exchange rates: fundamentalist 
and chartist.1 Fundamentalists believe that, absent special factors, 
exchange rates will tend to revert to their long-run equilibrium level. 
They forecast exchange rates on the basis of REEM models. Chartists 
extrapolate recent exchange rate changes into the longer-term future. 
1. Their model has antecedents in a number of other papers, such as Frankel and 
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Their actions tend to reinforce recent changes in exchange rates. 
At any one time, particular actors in the foreign exchange market 
tend to behave as either fundamentalists or chartists, but they may 
revise the principle used to forecast exchange rates if they find that 
the alternative behavior is currently more profitable. They choose 
between these two rules not because of a conviction that this results 
in actions that are perfectly rational, but because they are boundedly 
rational, that is, unable to understand the world in its full complexity 
and thus forced to resort to imperfect but comprehensible rules of 
thumb. They are rational in the sense that they discard a rule that 
is serving them badly.
De Grauwe and Grimaldi are unable to solve their model 
analytically, so they simulate the model several thousand times to 
establish its properties. Their main findings are as follows: 
—Exchange rate changes are usually disconnected from changes 
in fundamentals, although the exchange rate is cointegrated with its 
fundamental value
—The exchange rate is sometimes, but unpredictably, disconnected 
from its fundamental value and instead involved in bubble-and-crash 
dynamics; 
—If one sticks to one rule at all times, then a chartist rule tends 
to be more profitable than a fundamentalist rule (it can be better still 
to switch between these rules); and
—Exchange rate changes have fat tails. 
In other words, the model is consistent with the main facts about 
exchange rate markets that should cause acute embarrassment to 
those who still adhere to the profession’s mainstream model.
In this model, sterilized intervention is not always the exercise 
in futility suggested by conventional models, although that may 
be true (depending on unpredictable initial conditions) of the 
sort of ad hoc seat-of-the-pants intervention currently favored 
by most of the world’s monetary authorities. More systematic 
intervention, however, can help to limit misalignments. Assuming 
that it is used in that way (or even that it consistently leans 
against the wind), and that it is not a vain attempt to defend 
disequilibrium exchange rates, intervention tends to increase 
the profitability of fundamentalist trading strategies. By making 
fundamentalism more profitable, it encourages the private sector to 
adopt fundamentalist and not chartist strategies. The main impact 
of intervention has nothing to do with the portfolio changes on 
which most professional attention has focused.479 Do Development Considerations Matter for Exchange Rate Policy?
2.1 Corden’s Three Views of Exchange Rate Policy
Corden (2002) distinguishes three alternative views of the 
objectives of exchange rate policy. Perhaps the most familiar in Latin 
America is the nominal anchor view of the exchange rate, which 
holds that the purpose of exchange rate policy should be to provide 
the economy with a nominal anchor. Fix the exchange rate, and the 
postulate of zero-degree homogeneity of the system in all absolute 
prices ensures that all other prices will eventually be pinned down. 
That is surely true of equilibrium prices, but the theory is silent on 
the time that it will take to reach equilibrium and the costs of getting 
there. Experience in countries that have made an exchange rate anchor 
the center of their stabilization policy, including Chile in 1979–82, 
shows that those costs can be prohibitively high.
An alternative view is much more prevalent in my own country 
(Great Britain), where it also has a formidable academic pedigree. This 
view, which Corden calls the real targets view of the exchange rate, 
holds that the exchange rate, or maybe the exchange rate regime, should 
be chosen to facilitate the achievement of simultaneous internal and 
external balance. The (real) exchange rate has real effects in influencing 
from where demand is satisfied, and these should be exploited.
Corden calls his third approach the exchange stability view of 
the exchange rate. This is his own attempt to make some sense of 
the hostility to exchange flexibility found in many European circles. 
It holds that exchange rate volatility is capricious and that allowing 
it free rein can increase the total amount of instability in the system, 
so that keeping exchange rates fixed has some virtue. According to 
this view (for which there is some empirical support), suppressing 
exchange rate flexibility does not shift volatility to the interest rate, 
as is sometimes perceived, but reduces the total volume of noise.
Although some economists are happy to commit themselves 
wholeheartedly to one of these three views, it is not necessary to take 
such a narrow position. One can perfectly well recognize that several 
views have merit; different policies may be appropriate at different 
points in time, and one will need to trade these considerations off 
against one another. Indeed, part of my enthusiasm for the basket, 
band, and crawl (BBC) regime is stimulated by a belief that it offers a 
particularly favorable combination of exchange rate flexibility where 
it serves a serious social purpose and suppresses much of the more 
frivolous, frothy kind of volatility that serves only to increase the 
noise in the system.480 John Williamson
Corden’s taxonomy is thus a useful contribution to our 
understanding of exchange rate policy. My main criticism is that 
it is incomplete. It does not recognize the place of thinkers like the 
late Bela Balassa, who regarded a competitive exchange rate as a 
central instrument of development policy. My next task is to repair 
this lacuna.
2.2 The Development Strategy View of the Exchange 
Rate
The development strategy view of the exchange rate attempts 
to formalize the view advocated most prominently by Balassa. 
He held that a competitive exchange rate was a key incentive for 
outward-oriented development, which had a far better prospect of 
supporting sustained growth than inward-oriented policies. This 
helped spark the large literature in search of particular growth 
virtues in the production of nontraditional exports, exploring whether 
such exports offer better opportunities for productivity growth, 
generate greater competition in the economy, allow learning-by-
doing, propagate externalities, and so on. The channels at work 
have never been definitively identified, but the idea that a country 
is unlikely to get very far with its development if it allows the 
evisceration of its nontraditional export industries has become a part 
of conventional wisdom. The contention that a misaligned exchange 
rate—particularly an overvalued rate, although also a seriously 
undervalued rate—impedes growth receives strong empirical support 
in a recent study of Aguirre and Calderon (2006).
The basic idea of the development strategy view (laid out in 
Williamson, 2003) is to analyze the determinants of a growth-
maximizing exchange rate. A more competitive exchange rate 
increases the profitability of investing in tradables, so it is expected to 
increase investment in—and, in due course, the output of—tradable 
goods. It is also likely to have an analogous effect in decreasing the 
profitability of investment in nontradables, but that will probably 
leave a net negative impact on investment through a low exchange 
rate (that is, an overvalued currency), for two reasons.2 First, part of 
the demand for nontradables is a derived demand from the tradables 
2. In accordance with the Latin American tradition, an exchange rate is measured 
in this paper as the price of the national currency in terms of the dollar. Hence an 
appreciation of the national currency results in a lower exchange rate, and vice versa.481 Do Development Considerations Matter for Exchange Rate Policy?
sector, since many nontradables are inputs in the production of 
tradables. Second, the demand for nontradables is limited by the 
national market, while tradables sell on a world market that is 
typically many times the size of the national market. It is ultimately 
an empirical question as to whether a competitive exchange rate 
stimulates overall investment, and I am not aware of any studies 
that have addressed this issue. Unless and until empirical evidence 
indicates the need to drop what seems a natural assumption, I shall 
assume that a more competitive exchange rate increases the net 
desire to invest.
Some advocates of what they like to call export-led growth, notably 
the exponents of Bretton Woods II (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and 
Garber, 2003), stop the analysis at this point. They consider only the 
demand for investment, implicitly assuming that the resources to 
effect the desired level of investment are always available. This hyper-
Keynesian assumption may have been a reasonable approximation to 
conditions in China, on which their analysis has principally focused, 
although I would argue that even in China intertemporal utility 
would have been increased if the resources that were invested in low-
yielding U.S. Treasury bills had instead been used to increase domestic 
consumption. At any rate, it is an untenable assumption in general. 
Investment can be constrained by the supply-side—by the resources 
available for investment—as well as by the demand-side—by a lack 
of desire to invest.
The resources available for investment are domestic savings 
plus those that flow in through the current account. It was once 
generally assumed that growth was always constrained by the 
amount of investment that a country could undertake, so countries 
that imported more capital were expected to grow faster. This turns 
out not to be true (Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian, 2006), but that 
is no reason to go to the other extreme of assuming that all that 
matters is the incentive to invest. The development strategy view of 
the exchange rate considers both sides of the equation. It asserts that 
the growth-maximizing value of the exchange rate is characterized 
by the increased incentive to invest induced by a real depreciation 
being equal at the margin to the increased ability to invest allowed 
by a real appreciation.
In practice, the serious danger appears to be that open capital 
imports in good times will lead to overvaluation and a consequent 
danger of robust growth being undermined by Dutch disease. 
Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian (2006) conclude (like Aguirre 482 John Williamson
and Calderon, 2006) that the empirical evidence indicates that 
this harms growth in developing economies, although (contrary 
to Aguirre and Calderon) they find no evidence that the same is 
true in developed countries. Razin and Collins (1999) also find 
empirical evidence that serious overvaluation hurts growth in 
developing countries. The main casual support for the importance 
of a competitive exchange rate in preserving the incentive to invest 
comes from East Asia, where exchange rate policy is customarily 
considered one of the reasons for the region’s success. Perhaps the 
most conspicuous instance of defying balance-of-payments need 
and devaluing to sustain growth despite having ample reserves 
was provided by Indonesia in 1978. The contrast between the 
squandering of Nigeria’s oil wealth and the productive use to which 
the Suharto regime put (most of) Indonesia’s similar windfall is well 
known (see, for example, Little and others, 1993). A crucial element 
of the latter was the decision to devalue “unnecessarily.”
3. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
APPROACH
Assume first that both the growth-maximizing exchange rate and 
the equilibrium exchange rate are known to the government, and 
that they are the same. Standard theory says that optimal policy is 
to float freely, which will achieve the equilibrium rate (and thus the 
growth-maximizing rate). The behavioral view, in contrast, argues 
that the government can expect to reduce misalignments by a policy 
of intervention. The question is how those interventions should be 
structured: whether they should be ad hoc or systematic and, if the 
latter, how the system should be designed.
For many years, I argued in favor of a basket, band, and crawl 
(BBC) regime as the answer to this problem. It seems clear, however, 
that many governments value the freedom of not being constrained by 
exchange rate obligations, and they increasingly prefer to use inflation 
targeting rather than the exchange rate as their nominal anchor. These 
judgments seem sensible, and they are probably irreversible, so there 
is no point in trying to reverse them. The question is whether one 
could achieve some of the same advantages with a less constraining 
system than the BBC. I have argued that this could be accomplished 
with a reference rate system (Williamson, 2007), which offers a way 
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Specifically, a reference rate is an exchange rate that the 
authorities commit themselves not to push their exchange rate away 
from. It is in that sense an officially endorsed estimate of where the 
equilibrium rate lies. It carries no obligation to hold or even push the 
rate toward that level, but simply prohibits attempts to push the rate 
away from it. The obligation should extend to all policies designed 
specifically to influence the exchange rate: not just intervention in 
the foreign exchange market, but also jawboning (or so-called oral 
intervention, including declarations of faith in a strong currency), 
changing interest rates other than for reasons of domestic monetary 
management, changing capital controls, and so on. 
A reference rate can be surrounded by a monitoring zone for 
the exchange rate, defined as a zone within which intervention is 
prohibited. As long as the exchange rate remains in that zone, it 
floats freely. When it deviates more than 5 or 10 percent in effective 
terms (depending on the size of the monitoring zone) from the 
reference rate (which should also be defined in effective terms), 
then countries have the right—but not an obligation—to enter the 
market so as to try to limit further deviations. This provides a set 
of rules that both constrains governments from actions perceived 
to be against the international interest and informs the private 
market of what can be expected. If the behavioral model is basically 
right in that both market and oral intervention are effective tools, 
this could be expected to limit deviations of the effective rate from 
the reference rate.
Assume next that, although the authorities know both the 
growth-maximizing rate and the effective rate, the two are not 
equal. Specifically, consider the case that has often troubled 
people in Chile, where the growth-maximizing rate is higher (more 
depreciated) than the equilibrium rate. In this case, central bank 
operations can at best provide a breathing space for nonmonetary 
actions, because the equilibrium rate in the behavioral model 
is completely determined by fundamental factors, just as in the 
traditional model. Hence, it is only something that affects those 
fundamentals that can bring the long-run equilibrium rate into line 
with the growth-maximizing rate. Five candidates come to mind 
as falling in that category:
—Tighten fiscal policy (although I pity the finance minister who 
has to explain to the prime minister or president that they need to 
raise taxes or cut expenditures because the country is so prosperous 
and the foreigners are so anxious to lend money);484 John Williamson
—Impose controls to impede the entry or increase the cost of foreign 
capital (which Chile did when it imposed the encaje in the 1990s, but 
that eminently sensible instrument has now been abolished3);
—Accumulate foreign assets (as a number of countries are 
currently doing, including many East Asian countries, led by China; 
a number of oil exporters, with a few like Kuwait and Norway 
adopting it as a conscious act of long-term policy; and Singapore and 
Switzerland, which face low rates of return on investment at home 
and therefore see foreign asset accumulation as part of a strategy 
of optimal asset accumulation);
—Alter the currency composition of foreign borrowing (since a 
country’s currency will tend to be stronger if it borrows in foreign 
currency, as most Latin American countries traditionally have done, 
than if they issue more domestic-currency denominated debt and sell 
some of it to foreigners, who will hold more domestic debt only if it is 
available more cheaply); and 
—Impose export taxes on traditional exports (which Argentina is 
currently doing, and succeeding in maintaining a highly undervalued 
currency).
All of these actions are liable to impose costs of some sort, which 
presumably tend to increase progressively if the policy is pushed to 
more extreme levels. Restrictive fiscal policies involve higher taxes 
or lower expenditures (or both), which will be welcomed by neither 
taxpayers nor economists transfixed by distortions. Their most 
enthusiastic supporters are unlikely to deny that capital controls 
create distortions. Large reserves cost the taxpayers money whenever 
the rate of return on those reserves (including the likely future change 
in the exchange rate) is less than the opportunity cost of investing an 
equivalent sum in the domestic economy. So long as it commands less 
3. There is an extensive Chilean literature examining the effect of the encaje, 
which I once surveyed (Williamson, 2000, pp. 37–45). I was not persuaded by the many 
papers purporting to prove that the encaje had no effect on the level of capital inflow or 
the exchange rate. (Almost all papers agreed that the encaje altered the composition 
of borrowing, in the direction of increasing the maturity of the foreign debt.) To begin 
with, I could not understand why the encaje continued to evoke so much hostility if it 
were as ineffective as claimed: investment bankers laugh at ineffective instruments; 
they do not foam at the mouth. Nor could I understand why a tax yielding so much 
revenue should not be applauded if it had no effect on resource allocation; distortion-free 
taxes are the economist’s ideal, not something to be dismissed as useless. I argued that 
the reason empirical work had often failed to uncover a relation between the encaje 
and capital inflows or exchange rates was that a given level of encaje could influence 
either one or the other (or some combination of them), but that which of the two would 
be influenced would depend on policy and would not (as the econometricians had all 
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confidence, domestic-currency debt will require a higher yield in order 
to attract foreign buyers. Yet another set of distortions is created by 
taxing some exports at a different rate than others. Hence, a country 
that seeks to resist an excessively low (uncompetitive) exchange rate 
will usually find it advantageous to apply a mix of policies, rather than 
relying on any single policy to prevent overvaluation.
What is clearly not tenable is the view that the exchange rate given 
by the market has to be accepted stoically as a fact of life. It may not 
be worthwhile to try to avoid an uncompetitive rate, but one would 
expect that a country in which growth matters would be willing to pay 
some price to limit overvaluation. Much more persuasive is the view 
that the tools needed to devalue the long-run equilibrium exchange 
rate are not those of the central bank, but even this has to be qualified. 
For example, prudential regulations on the banking system will have 
some of the same effects as capital controls. It is sensible to limit the 
open position that banks can take. If they are allowed to extend foreign 
currency loans to the nontradable sector at all, they should be required 
to recognize that this practice involves risks and to insure those risks 
(see Rojas-Suarez, 2003). Again, the mix of reserves and domestic credit 
used to achieve a given expansion of the money supply will have some 
effect on the equilibrium exchange rate, and this is within the control 
of the central bank. The effect of both factors is likely to be minor, but 
it is not true that all the instruments wielded by central banks are, in 
principle, unable to influence the equilibrium exchange rate.
Do I believe that it is still important to maintain a competitive 
exchange rate in Chile? Yes, though I doubt it is as important as it was 
in the 1990s. Chile still has many poor people to absorb into the modern 
economy, and as long as this remains true, the finding that a competitive 
exchange rate lacks explanatory power for the growth of a developed 
country cannot be used to dismiss concern over the exchange rate.4 
3.1 Ignorance
So far the analysis has been conducted on the supposition that 
the authorities know both the growth-maximizing exchange rate and 
the long-run equilibrium rate. What are the implications of a more 
realistic recognition of their limited clairvoyance?
Total ignorance is inconceivable. There is always some sense of what 
exchange rate is inappropriate. The crucial question would seem to be 
whether the authorities or the market have a better sense of what the 
4. And even this finding is disputed, as noted above.486 John Williamson
growth-maximizing and equilibrium rates are. If the authorities know 
less than the market (which is probably believed by some advocates 
of floating), then presumably they should do nothing. Similarly, if 
prompt action by the authorities is constrained by foolish institutional 
constraints (like those of Bretton Woods, which obliged the authorities 
to defend an inherited parity until it was clear to the market that it was 
indefensible), it is preferable for them to cease to be active.
It is more intellectually interesting and perhaps more realistic to 
consider the other case, in which the authorities have a better idea of the 
long-run equilibrium exchange rate than the market. The authorities 
have both the resources and the incentive to undertake research on 
the question, whereas it is unclear that any individual market trader 
does. Traders rarely command the resources to undertake a major 
research effort, and their primary interest is in where the exchange 
rate is likely to jump in the next few minutes, rather than what it is 
likely to average over the next few years. Furthermore, the relevant 
question is whether the authorities are less prone to being driven to 
extreme positions than market operators, not whether they are more 
accurate on average. Under these conditions, it seems that a reference 
rate system would again be totally appropriate.
Estimating the growth-maximizing exchange rate is a far less 
familiar practice than estimating the long-run equilibrium exchange 
rate (on which there is now a vast academic literature). This theoretical 
construct brings out two points. First, it reinforces the proposition that 
it is a policy mistake to let the market exchange rate fall substantially 
below the equilibrium exchange rate for a considerable period. Second, 
it emphasizes that it may be necessary to contemplate nonmonetary 
measures to increase the exchange rate. It would be good to know a lot 
more, and Aguirre and Calderon (2006) begin to take matters forward. 
They find that the growth-maximizing exchange rate is typically 
somewhat more competitive than the equilibrium exchange rate. 
Their estimate is that a moderate undervaluation, of up to about 12 
percent, is likely to lead to a faster growth rate than the equilibrium 
exchange rate would generate, so presumably their implicit estimate 
of the growth-maximizing exchange rate is about 6 percent higher 
than the equilibrium rate. They are pessimistic about the feasibility 
of finding policy actions that will sustain an undervaluation of that 
size, but that is another issue.5
5. My own candidate would be the imposition of additional taxation on interest 
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4. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has made several points. First, the current fashion in 
the profession for clean (that is, unmanaged) floating exchange rates 
rests on an empirically erroneous model. A behavioral model in better 
accord with the stylized facts suggests that a systematic policy of 
sterilized intervention can limit the misalignments to which floating 
rates are subject. Second, the maintenance of a sufficiently competitive 
exchange rate to ensure the continued growth of nontraditional exports 
is vital to the long-run growth rate; this accentuates the importance 
of preventing misalignments involving a very low exchange rate. 
However, changing the equilibrium exchange rate to bring it more into 
line with the growth-maximizing rate in the event of a discrepancy 
is likely to require non-monetary tools like restrictive fiscal policy, 
controls on capital imports, accumulation of foreign assets, altering 
the currency composition of foreign borrowing, and the imposition of 
taxes on traditional exports or additional taxes on interest earned by 
foreign residents. Finally, good measures of the growth-maximizing 
exchange rate are not yet available, and very few studies explore the 
policy measures that might be able to influence the equilibrium rate 
if it diverges from the growth-maximizing rate. One possibility that 
deserves examination is a tax surcharge on interest income earned 
by foreign residents.
Although the central bank does not command instruments 
adequate to avoid overvaluation, it should not be indifferent to a major 
misalignment. The central bank has an important role in deciding the 
range of policies that a country adopts, and intervention provides a 
crucial tool until other instruments are brought into play. Central 
banks need to concern themselves about misalignments and especially 
overvaluation. 488 John Williamson
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